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Location-based Services (LBSs) provide valuable services, with convenient features for mobile users. However,
the location and other information disclosed through each query to the LBS erodes user privacy. This is a
concern especially because LBS providers can be honest-but-curious, collecting queries and tracking users’
whereabouts and infer sensitive user data. This motivated both centralized and decentralized location privacy
protection schemes for LBSs: anonymizing and obfuscating LBS queries to not disclose exact information,
while still getting useful responses. Decentralized schemes overcome disadvantages of centralized schemes,
eliminating anonymizers, and enhancing users’ control over sensitive information. However, an insecure
decentralized system could create serious risks beyond private information leakage. More so, attacking an
improperly designed decentralized LBS privacy protection scheme could be an effective and low-cost step
to breach user privacy. We address exactly this problem, by proposing security enhancements for mobile
data sharing systems. We protect user privacy while preserving accountability of user activities, leveraging
pseudonymous authentication with mainstream cryptography. We show our scheme can be deployed with
off-the-shelf devices based on an experimental evaluation of an implementation in a static automotive testbed.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Location privacy, honest-but-curious, pseudonymous authentication
1 INTRODUCTION
A Location-based Service (LBS) query targets a location/region and expresses one or more specific
user interests; the LBS server responds with the most up-to-date relevant information, e.g., the latest
menu of a restaurant, movies at a cinema, remaining parking slots at a shopping mall, or traffic
conditions in the area. During this process, users’ current or future whereabouts and interests are
disclosed to the LBS server through their queries. All submitted information is deemed necessary to
best serve users, and the LBS server is entrusted with rich data. However, many studies [5, 15, 62]
reveal that service providers can be honest-but-curious, aggressively collecting information to
profile users, e.g., identifying home or working places or inferring interests for commercial purposes.
LBS privacy is studied extensively. Location k-anonymity [16] ensures that at least k − 1 other
users are involved in an obfuscated region, R, used as the querier’s location. Therefore, even
in the presence of a local observer in R, the query cannot be linked to a certain user; the LBS
server only learns the querier is one among k users in R. Protection can be achieved by centralized
schemes [16, 45, 46] that introduce an anonymizer, a proxy between users and the LBS server, which
anonymizes user queries before sending them to the LBS server. However, the assumed anonymizer
trustworthiness merely “shifts” the trust from the LBS server to the anonymizer, holding rich
information the same way that the LBS server would. Simply put, an anonymizer could be itself
honest-but-curious.
Decentralized approaches [19, 53] can eliminate the need for an anonymizer and protect user
privacy in a collaborative manner: for example, form an obfuscated area with k users within each
other’s communication range [19]. However, if such k users are too close, e.g., in a church, a
shopping mall, or a cinema, such symbolic “addresses” can still be disclosed. Thus, it is hard to
define how large k should be to ensure an appropriate level of protection.
An alternative collaborative privacy protection approach is to pass/share LBS-obtained informa-
tion among users, to decrease exposure to the LBS server [31, 55]. The sharing approach requires
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nodes to cache information received from the LBS and pass it to neighbors when requested. More-
over, sharing (and thus reduced exposure to the LBS server) is orthogonal to location obfuscation;
the two could complement each other.
Nonetheless, opening up the system functionality is a double-edged sword: sharing reduces user
exposure to the curious provider (LBS or anonymizer) but it also exposes her to possibly faulty,
misbehaving or curious peers. In fact, studies on peer-to-peer (P2P) systems [32, 40, 63] show that
insecure decentralized schemes face serious problems: sensitive information could be exposed to
peers and malicious nodes could pass on bogus data.
Signed LBS server responses can be self-verifiable when passed to peers [55] and partially address
the second above-mentioned concern regarding malicious nodes. However, queries and cached
information from different users could be diverse, making it necessary to share one or multiple
complete LBS-obtained responses (each with a signature attached), even though only a subset of
each LBS-obtained response might be needed by the querying peer. For example, the query could be
What is the menu of restaurant A? and How many parking spaces are available at B? while another
node could query What are the opening hours of restaurant A? and What stores are in shopping
mall B? It is not straightforward to decide whether the peer responses include information as if
the the response were directly obtained from the LBS server, thus, guaranteeing quality of service.
Even though nodes can assess the completeness of gathered peer responses [44] and wait until
the required completeness is met, peer responses equivalent to an LBS response can be hard to
achieve; and, in any case, incur significant delays and overhead, i.e., redundant cryptographic fields
and information. Last but not least, peer queries, openly submitted to nodes’ neighborhood, could
expose users to other nodes and passive eavesdroppers.
These challenges are addressed here by our security architecture for secure and resilient decen-
tralized/collaborative privacy protection for LBSs. We propose new components orthogonal to the
LBS functionality. We leverage pseudonymous authentication to provide privacy-enhancing mes-
sage authentication and integrity for communication with other users/peers and with infrastructure
entities. We also leverage proactive caching of Point of Interest (POI) data (e.g., for a region) by a
small fraction of users (termed serving nodes) that serve others, sharing the cached POI data. This
ensures that peer responses can provide the same quality as direct LBS responses without extra
communication incurred by using an obfuscated area. This also enables cross-checking multiple
peer responses to the same query, to detect false responses from malicious nodes. The burden
is balanced among users through a periodical randomized role assignment by the infrastructure.
While users benefit from the information sharing system, our scheme minimizes their exposure to
the LBS server and limits exposure to curious serving nodes (thanks to encrypted querying and
serving node communication). Our evaluation shows both effective exposure reduction and highly
successful valid POI provision in a realistic intelligent transportation setting, even with a very high
(in practice) fraction (e.g., 20 %) of curious or malicious nodes.
The contributions of this paper are: (1) use of pseudonymous authentication for privacy-preserving
user authentication, (2) privacy-enhancing randomized serving node assignment and encrypted P2P
query-response exchange, (3) cross-checking of P2P responses and privacy-preserving proactive
LBS response validation, (4) qualitative and extensive quantitative simulation-based security and
privacy analyses, (5) comparison to the state-of-the-art, MobiCrowd [55], in terms of achieved
privacy and security, and efficiency (notably, communication overhead), and (6) experimental
evaluation leveraging a field-operational-test grade automotive communication testbed, emulating
real-world conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We discuss related work in Sec. 2. We outline the
system and adversarial models, as well as requirements in Sec. 3. Then, we present the proposed
scheme in Sec. 4. We provide a qualitative security and privacy analysis in Sec. 5.1, followed by an
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extensive quantitative simulation-based evaluation in Sec. 5.2. We show experimental evaluation
results with our scheme implemented on an automotive testbed, and discuss design choices for its
deployment in real-world scenarios (Sec. 6) before we conclude (Sec. 7).
2 RELATEDWORK
User queries, including user locations and interests, are essential information for LBSs to best serve
users; this very same information can also be used to breach user privacy. Queries from the same
user can be linked and eventually used to reconstruct user traces and infer user activities, e.g.,
home or work addresses. Anonymization or pseudonymization, i.e., removal of user identities or
their replacement with pseudonymous identities, prevents the LBS server from correlating real user
identities with queries. The LBS server only sees a pool of user queries without any information
that immediately identifies the querying users. However, studies have shown that simply removing
identities from frequent queries could not prevent tracking and even profiling (e.g., inferring real
names) of specific users [24, 26, 28].
Location obfuscation: Location obfuscation uses cloaked areas or perturbed locations to rep-
resent actual user locations. Cloaked areas [4, 9] can be used so that the LBS server only learns
the area the user is in and then responds with the information that pertains to the whole area.
However, a determined attacker could learn which users are located in this area. If, in an arguably
rare situation, the user is the only one included in this area, the attacker can easily link the query
with the only user “seen” in this area. Location k-anonymity [23, 37] is used to form an obfuscated
area involving at least k users, so that the user would not stand out from the obfuscated area.
However, merely using k-anonymity could not guarantee an area constructed based on k users
large enough to hide symbolic address (e.g., church, shopping mall and gas station). Therefore, in
densely populated areas, the perturbed/obfuscated region should be large enough so that all nodes
within the area are not closely gathered. At the same time, the quality of the LBS response would
be affected if the location in the query is not accurate enough. Thus, it is hard to define how large
should k be to ensure an appropriate level of privacy protection. Geo-indistinguishability [1, 3, 13]
uses perturbed locations to represent user locations, adding Laplacian noise to user locations based
on the required degree of privacy. This trades off accuracy of POI data for higher privacy. Both
approaches could fail to protect node privacy when multiple queries can be correlated [1, 56].
Moreover, schemes based onk-anonymity can be vulnerable to the so-called center of Anonymized
Spatial Region (ASR) attack: the probability of the requesting node being the node closest to the
center of ASR is larger than 1/k [19, 33]. Such an attack can be prevented by applying a k-anonymity
algorithm to one of the neighbors. These neighbors are discovered by applying the k-anonymity
algorithm to itself. This generates a cloaked region that is not necessarily centered around oneself.
Centralized and decentralized approaches: Both centralized and decentralized variants of the
above-mentioned privacy enhancing techniques were proposed. Centralized approaches introduce a
Trusted Third Party (TTP) that acts as a so-called anonymizer for the queries sent to the LBS server.
The anonymizer could find k − 1 nearest neighbors of the querying user and send the queries from
all k users to the LBS server [4] . The anonymizer can also remove user identities from the queries
before sending them to the LBS server, while keeping information that matches user identities and
queries locally, so that it can appropriately respond to each user the needed information. However,
there can be an inherent controversy here: we assume the LBS server is honest-but-curious, but
the anonymizer could be honest-but-curious too. The (centralized) anonymizer could collect user
queries and use the information the same way the LBS server would.
Decentralized approaches thwart honest-but-curious infrastructure by relying on users. To
achieve k-anonymity with decentralized schemes, users can search for k − 1 neighbors in an
ad-hoc network and use the area including these k users as the cloaked area [10, 17–19, 27, 29].
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However, this incurs high communication overhead among peers: a node needs to initiate the
process whenever it wants to query the LBS server. To reduce overhead and complexity of peers,
anonymizer peers can be used, that act as a temporary proxy for their neighbors [53]. Therefore,
users do not need to search for neighbors everytime. AMOEBA [53] protects user privacy by
forming groups and delegating LBS queries to anonymizer peers, termed group leaders. The group
members send the queries to the group leaders that act as the TTP in centralized schemes: the group
leaders query the LBS server with collected queries and distribute the responses to each group
member. Such group formation and provision of k-anonymity (both centralized and decentralized)
are orthogonal to our work here. In fact, they could possibly co-exist with and even be facilitated
by our scheme, which explicitly addresses trust assumptions and provides a security architecture.
Caching and sharing: Caching and sharing POI data [39, 42, 44, 48, 55] are orthogonal to above-
mentioned protection approaches. Cached POI data can serve future queries and reduce direct
queries to the LBS server. Road-side infrastructure can proactively cache POI data [42, 48] and serve
user queries; however, users would be vulnerable to honest-but-curious road-side infrastructure
entities. Nodes can cache information received from the LBS server and pass to neighbors when
requested [39, 44, 55]. This is the approach we extend in this paper. Gathered partial POI data from
neighbors can form more complete POI data [39, 44], but it is hard to examine whether the gathered
POI data covers all that could be obtained directly from the LBS server. Moreover, such approaches
are vulnerable to data pollution by malicious or semi-honest nodes, providing masqueraded POI
data or partial data (from available own data) to mislead other nodes. Responses signed by the
LBS server [55] can be self-verifiable allowing detection of manipulation by a node. However, a
misbehaving node passing on tampered responses would remain “invisible” and continue attacking
the system, wasting computational power [31]. Moreover, decentralizing functionality could provide
an easy way for passive adversaries to learn information from neighbors. Thus, it is important for
collaborative approaches to consider internal and external passive or active adversaries. This is
exactly where this work comes in: providing a secure and privacy-enhancing LBS while protecting
benign nodes against both honest-but-curious and malicious nodes/peers.
Location privacy in other areas: Location privacy has also been widely studied in relevant
areas. SPPEAR [20] and SHIELD [21] propose a state of the art architecture and protocols for secure
and privacy preserving participatory sensing. Users obtain short-term credentials and contribute
sensing data pseudonymously to a central aggregator [20]. The aggregator makes use of the large
volume of received sensed data to filter out outliers [21]. The aggregated data is made available
through queries submitted to the aggregator; this can be done securely and privately with our
proposal here.
In Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs), privacy is important, because high rate vehicle-
transmitted safety beacons with location information for awareness among neighboring vehicles,
expose vehicle activities. More importantly, vehicle messages need to be authenticated, but using
traditional certificates would trivially allow linking messages sent from a vehicle. This motivates the
use of pseudonymous authentication [50] for message unlinkability while providing message and
entity authentication. The most recent proposals protect users from honest-but-curious credential
providers and investigate deployment and scalability aspects [2, 22, 34, 35]. In our scheme, pseudony-
mous authentication is an important component for providing secure and privacy-preserving LBS.
We explain how this is customized and integrated in our design in Sec. 4.2.
Query privacy: Apart from location privacy, query privacy is an important issue for LBS: the
content of queries could disclose user interests. Location privacy protection schemes based on
k-anonymity could potentially protect query privacy: with at least k queries sent together to the
LBS server, the LBS server could not figure out which node each query belongs to. However, if a
specific POI type has higher popularity than other types, then multiple (among the k) nodes could
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be interested in the same POI type; this reduces the query diversity of these k queries [12, 43, 51].
Query l-diversity [12] proposes to form a cloaked region involving user queries that have at least l
POI types. However, this approach fails to provide location and query privacy protection if a node
continuously queries for the same POI type during its trip: intersection of multiple (spatially and
temporally) consecutive k-anonymized and l-diversified query sets could result in a pair of distinct
node and POI type (i.e., the querying node and the queried POI type). An anonymizer can take
past queries into consideration and form the consecutive cloaking areas involving the same set
of POI types [12, 51]. Private retrieval of POIs [30, 61] searches an encrypted POI database with
anonymized queries that do not disclose any query content to the LBS server. We note that such
query privacy protection approaches are orthogonal to sharing-based approaches (including our
scheme), which decrease the ratio of queries disclosed to the LBS server, thus can complement each
other.
3 SYSTEMMODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
System Model: Fig. 1 illustrates the considered system architecture. Mobile devices (termed nodes
or peers in the rest of the paper), e.g., smartphones and vehicular On-board Units (OBUs), are
equipped with multiple communication interfaces, e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular data. They can access
LBSs, submitting queries regarding their current locations/regions. They also communicate in a
P2P manner over a wireless ad hoc (e.g., IEEE 802.11p) or cellular (e.g., LTE direct) network. Nodes
can share POI data and choose to query the LBS server only when no satisfactory response is
received from their peers. Nodes are registered with an identity and credential management system
(i.e., a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)) comprising Certification Authorities (CAs) (see Sec. 4 for
more details). The PKI issues credentials to the registered nodes and the Service Providers (SPs)
(i.e., the LBS servers here), so that SPs and nodes can interact securely. We assume nodes have
connectivity to the LBS and the PKI through Internet (e.g, via cellular data, 3G or 4G, or Wi-Fi
networks) throughout their trips.
Adversary Model:We assume LBS servers are honest-but-curious: they follow the protocols,
responding faithfully to queries, but they may trace the nodes (linking their queries) or even
de-anonymize them and infer sensitive data (e.g., home and work sites). This is because queries
sent to the LBS servers expose user locations and interests, and can be used to infer additional
user information. We maintain and extend the honest-but-curious assumption to cover any TTP,
including the ones we introduce in our scheme, notably the PKI (Sec. 4).
Nodes can be also honest-but-curious or deviate from the protocols. Honest-but-curious nodes
could stay in the network and collect peer queries and responses. A single honest-but-curious node
could have negligible effect on the privacy of legitimate nodes. However, if such honest-but-curious
nodes collaborate and merge their transcripts of all queries they overheard from peers in the
system, it is very likely they are powerful enough to threaten user privacy. An adversary could
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recruit otherwise benign participants (e.g., with some incentives) and then fetch and merge their
query and response transcripts; or user equipment (OBUs, smartphones) could be compromised by
malware that propagates across the the network and enable the adversary access such transcripts.
Furthermore, nodes can deviate from the collaborative protocol functionality and policies and
attack the system, notably their peers. They can forge or tamper with responses and masquerade
other nodes. This could, in turn, affect the quality of service, i.e., the timeliness and authenticity of
POI data obtained from peers, and thus force benign nodes, which may get no useful POI data, to
query directly (i.e., expose themselves to) the LBS server(s).
Requirements:We require that peer-provided information be verifiable and nodes be account-
able for their actions (messages). Nodes should be able to efficiently obtain POI data from their
peers with the same quality as that obtained directly from the LBS server. While nodes benefit from
P2P POI data sharing, node exposure to neighboring, both assisting and non-assisting, peers and
the LBS server should be minimized. Towards these objectives, the following security and privacy
requirements need to be met:
Authentication and integrity - Node messages should allow their receivers to corroborate the
legitimacy of their senders (Note: not their identity; please see anonymity/pseudonymity below.)
and verify they were not modified or replayed.
Accountability - Message senders should not be able to deny having sent a message (non-
repudiation). Any node can be tied to its actions, and, if need arises, be held accountable and
possibly have its long-term identity revealed and have itself evicted from the system.
Anonymity/Pseudonymity and unlinkability - Node actual (long-term) identities should not be
linked to their P2P and node-to-LBS messages. Anonymity should be conditional, allowing the
system to identify a misbehaving node and evict it. Ideally, it should be impossible for any observer
to link any two or more messages (e.g., queries) by the same node. However, for efficiency reasons,
messages can be linkable at most over a protocol selectable period, τ .
Confidentiality and reduced exposure - POI data and sensitive user information (e.g., node queries)
should be accessible only by authorized entities; the amount of information revealed to peers and
the LBS server should be minimal.
Resilience - Nodes should be resilient to (compromised) malicious nodes that actively disrupt
their operations and deviate from protocol definitions. In particular, they should be able to validate
correctness of information to reject bogus POI data generated by malicious nodes.
Sybil-resistance - A registered node should be able to participate only with a single identity
(pseudonym) at any point in time. It should not be able to be present in the system with multiple
legitimate identities (thus, as multiple participants) and inappropriately affect the outcome of
protocols.
4 OUR SCHEME
In this section, we introduce our decentralized privacy protection scheme in detail. Our design
is driven by privacy, resilience and efficiency considerations. Our approach significantly extends
P2P data sharing LBS privacy schemes [31, 55], addressing a broad(er) set of requirements (Sec. 3)
and contributing the following main ideas: (1) Each node is equipped with short-term anonymous
credentials, to authenticate all node-to-node and node-to-LBS interactions. (2) Peer-provided POI
data can be drawn from a large volume of POI data, proactively distributed by the LBS server to a
small fraction of randomly chosen nodes, termed serving nodes. (3) Nodes submit queries to serving
nodes, which periodically announce their presence and available POI data (i.e., POI data for their
regions). (4) Encrypted peer query and response messages, to minimize revealed information to
neighboring nodes. (5) Cross-checking of peer responses and proactive checking with the LBS
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server, to validate peer responses and detect/evict malicious nodes. Table 1 summarizes the used
notation.
Table 1. Notation
U A node(/user)
LTCA Long-Term Certification Authority
PCA Pseudonymous Certification Authority
RA Resolution Authority
Lk/LK Long-term Private/Public Key
LTC Long-Term Certificate
Sk/SK Short-term Private/Public Key
PC Short-term/Pseudonymous Certificate
Ks A symmetric session key
SN Serial Number
(n/q/r )id (Node/Query/Region) identifier
L Square region side length
G Number of POI type groups
N Maximum peer requests per node query
Γ/τ Pseudonym request interval/Pseudonym lifetime
Prserve Probability of serving node assignment
Tserve Serving period of each serving node assignment
Prcheck Probability of checking with the LBS server
Tbeacon Beacon interval
TPOI POI update interval
Twait Beacon waiting time before requesting the LBS server
Qr id A query for POI data in a region, r id
POIr id POI data covering an entire region, r id
t/tnow Timestamp/Fresh timestamp indicating current time
{msд }σLTC/PC Signed message with signature and LTC/PC attached
EK (msд) Encryption of message with K
Siдn(msд, LTC/PC) Signature on a message with corresponding Lk/Sk under LTC/PC
H () Hash function
Send (msд, E) Send a message to an entity E
Receive(msд, E) Receive a message from an entity E
4.1 Overview
Nodes are interested in diverse POI data throughout their trips. The LBS server maintains a database
of real-time POI data, subject to change over time. Without loss of generality, we assume: POI data
is refreshed/updated every TPOI ; the area (e.g., of a city) is divided into a number of equally sized
regions; nodes are interested in POI data for regions they are currently in.
The LBS server and the nodes in the system are registered with an identity and credential
management facility, i.e., a PKI. A Long-Term Certification Authority (LTCA) issues a Long-Term
Certificate (LTC) for each registered node, used as a long-term identity for the node. With the LTC, a
node can obtain an LTCA-issued ticket, presented to a Pseudonymous Certification Authority (PCA)
for obtaining Pseudonymous Certificates (PCs)/pseudonyms (if the ticket is validated). The ticket
is authenticated by the LTCA but it is anonymized: it does not reveal the long-term (real) node
identity (refereed as node identity in the rest of the paper) to the PCA [34, 35]. Therefore, a single
LTCA or a single PCA cannot link the node identity to the issued pseudonyms. Thus, the messages
signed under PCs are also unlinkable to the node identity. To ensure unlinkability after a change of
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Fig. 2. Illustration of peer query and response collection.
pseudonym, the node can randomly reset its IP and MAC address. This duty separation is based on
work done in the context of Vehicular Communication (VC) systems [22, 34, 35]. The ticket and
pseudonym acquisition protocols are presented in Sec. 4.2.
Pseudonyms are used by nodes to authenticate themselves to the system entities, including the
LBS server and other nodes (peers), and to establish secure communication channel between system
entities. Messages are signed under (i.e., with the private keys corresponding to) pseudonyms in
order to hide node identities while providing message authentication and integrity.
We assign to the PCA the responsibility for probabilistically choosing the serving nodes. A serving
node is responsible for requesting extensive POI data, covering an entire region (termed regional
POI data), consisting of POI entries for that region, from the LBS server; storing the POI data in its
local storage; and serving other nodes whose requests it receives. The PCA explicitly assigns/binds
such a role to PCs (i.e., by setting a specific field in each PC) it issues; thus nodes cannot masquerade
serving nodes. Each serving node broadcasts beacons periodically, messages indicating the region it
is in. The beacon is signed and the pseudonym is attached, so that any receiver can establish a secure
communication channel with the serving node. This prevents exposure of all the communication
to nearby nodes, thus disclosure of nodes’ interests and presence in the region. A node in need of
POI data queries multiple serving nodes; with multiple redundant responses, it can cross-check
and validate the obtained data and, at the same time, detect peer node misbehavior (e.g., provision
of false, forged, or outdated POI data). Fig. 2 shows an example of the operation concerning peer
node queries. At t1, Q becomes interested in some POI data and it starts listening for serving node
beacons (Fig. 2a). At t2,Q moves within the communication range of S1; it queries S1 upon a receipt
of one of its broadcasted beacons (Fig. 2b); at t3, Q encounters another serving node, S2, it queries
S2, and then cross-checks the two responses (Fig. 2c).
The LBS server is also issued an LTC, used to authenticate itself to the nodes and infrastructure
entities. The LBS server and the nodes are involved in (i.e., registeredwith) the same PKI architecture,
so that the LBS server is also able to authenticate the nodes with their PCs. The LBS server
authenticates itself with the LTC and provides message integrity and authentication by signing the
messages.
Furthermore, to prevent abuse of the node anonymity, our scheme provides conditional anonymity
and allows revocation of anonymity and eviction of nodes. The node interactions with the facility
entities are explained throughout this section below (Sec. 4.2). While we assume the certificates of
system entities (i.e., authorities and the LBS server) are pre-installed in each node, all the messages
signed under PCs should be attached with the corresponding PCs. We mandate that all signatures
must be verified before the messages can be processed. However, for simplicity, we skip the steps
for signature verifications in the algorithms and protocols: progress in protocol execution indicates
signatures are already validated.
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4.2 Pseudonymous Authentication
System Time
U3:
U1:
Pseudonym set acquisition
U2:
τ τ τ τ τ τ
Node's trip
Fig. 3. Example of ticket and pseudonym set acquisitions with Γ = 2τ for various node trips
Ticket and Pseudonym Acquisition: We refer the reader to [35], for a detailed protocol
description of LTC issuance. Here, we focus on our customized pseudonym issuance protocol. We
follow the privacy-enhancing pseudonym issuance policy proposed in [34, 35]: independently of
the time of contacting the LTCA/PCA, all pseudonym lifetimes are aligned. This implies that nodes
change their pseudonyms at the same time, and as a result, the successive pseudonyms of a specific
node would not be linked based on pseudonym lifetimes. In our scheme, we do not restrict the
ticket lifetimes to be started at same time, since the anonymity set (all nodes registered with an
LTCA) for ticket acquisition is large enough considering an expected large number of nodes in the
system. Fig. 3 shows an example of pseudonym issuance for nodes with various trips, for Γ = 2τ .
For each pseudonym request, a node always requests Γ/τ pseudonyms. In general, a node is more
likely to start its trip in the middle of a τ period. As shown in Fig. 3, the first pseudonym of a node is
not valid from the beginning of a τ period, but from the beginning of the trip until the end of that τ
period. For the rest of the trip, the node always requests Γ/τ pseudonyms from the PCA. Although
a node (e.g., U1) could finish its trip shortly after its last pseudonym acquisition, the node always
requests pseudonyms with lifetimes covering the entire Γ period: there is a practical uncertainty
for the trip duration and this hides the trip ending time from both the LTCA and the PCA.
U → LTCA : ticket_req{ts }σLTCU (1)
LTCA : check(nidU , ts ) (2)
LTCA→ C : ticket = {SNt icket , ts }σLTCLTCA (3)
U : n = ⌈ Γ
τ
⌉ (4)
U : {Ski , SKi }, i ∈ [0,n) (5)
U → PCA : pseudonym_req{ticket , {SK0}σSk1 ...{SKn−1}σSkn−1 } (6)
PCA : ts0 = ts , te0 = ts − (ts mod τ ) + τ (7)
PCA : tsi = tei−1 , tei = tsi + τ , i ∈ [1,n) (8)
PCA : s = 1 with probability Prserve , s = 0 otherwise. (9)
PCA→ U : PCi = {SNPCi , SKi , s, tsi , tei }σLTCPCA , i ∈ [0,n) (10)
When a node needs to request pseudonyms, it sends a request to the LTCA with a pseudonym
validity starting time, ts (1). For a node starting its new trip, ts is the trip beginning (e.g., the
beginning of the first dashed circle forU1 in Fig. 3); while for a node in the middle of its trip, ts is the
starting point of next Γ period (e.g., the beginning of the second dashed circle). The pseudonyms
are issued for the remaining time of each Γ, as we described earlier. The LTCA checks if a ticket
9
was issued with an overlapping lifetime, based on the locally stored ticket issuance history for each
node (2); if not, it issues a ticket valid from ts (3). With the ticket in hand, the node obtains a set
of pseudonyms from the PCA: the node generates the needed public/private key pairs and sends
self-signed public keys with the ticket to the PCA (4-6). The anonymized ticket does not reveal
the node identity to the PCA. The PCA calculates the lifetimes of pseudonyms according to the
pseudonym lifetime policy (7-8). The assignment of serving nodes is done during the pseudonym
issuance process. The PCA assigns the requesting node as a serving node with probability Prserve .
This is achieved by setting a field, s , in each PC (9-10). It indicates that the node possessing the
pseudonym is responsible for requesting POI data from the LBS server and serving other nodes. We
align the serving period,Tserve , of a serving node with Γ, thus all pseudonyms for the Γ period will
be assigned the same s . Both ticket and pseudonym acquisitions are done across secure channels.
We explain our resilient and privacy-enhancing LBS functionality in more detail in Sec. 4.3.
Reporting Misbehavior: When misbehavior (of any type) is detected by a node, the node sends
to the Resolution Authority (RA) the messages related to the misbehavior, with the corresponding
pseudonyms attached. In case the messages are proved to be related to misbehavior, the LTC of the
misbehaving node is exposed (and the node possibly evicted from the system) by the RA with the
help of the LTCA and PCA. The revoked LTCs/PCs are published through a Certificate Revocation
List (CRL). We describe the response validation process in Sec. 4.3 in more detail.
4.3 Privacy-enhancing LBS
LBS Query Model: We divide a large area (e.g., a city) into equally-sized regions, each with a
unique identifier, rid . A node is interested in POI data, of various types, around its current location.
This can be any subset of the regional POI data, which comprise various POI data types. For example,
a node query could be What are the menus of nearby restaurants? and How many parking spaces are
available nearby? Without loss of generality, we assume that POI data in the LBS server is updated
every TPOI , with the expiry time explicitly indicated in returned POI data; which have varying
lifetimes, depending on their types. Basic information of some POI entries (e.g., name and address
of a restaurant) could remain unchanged for several years, while others, e.g., weather and traffic
conditions or parking availability could be updated on a frequent basis (e.g., every 10 minutes). We
capture a generalized POI update frequency with a constant TPOI and we are mainly concerned
with frequently updated POI data. POI data with longer lifetimes could actually be preloaded to user
devices. For example, Google Maps1 provide offline caching of POI data (e.g., names and addresses),
so that they can be queried locally, without an Internet connection. However, frequently updated
POI data (e.g., traffic or road conditions, or available parking slots) cannot be preloaded and should
be obtained on-demand. Each node can cache POI data it received and use the information as long
as it is not expired: a node does not initiate a query for the same piece of data it cached before
the data expires; new queries seeks POI data for a different location or POI type than those of
non-expired POI data in its cache.
Regional POI Data: Once cached by a serving node, they can be used to serve other nodes.
For region-based queries [48, 55], nodes are assumed to be interested in POI data for their current
regions. Thus, regional POI data includes POI data within the corresponding region. A limitation
of such a query model is that, for some POI types, no response is available in the querier’s current
region, although the nearest out-of-region POI data can be still valuable. Typically, in this situation,
a direct query to the LBS server could be serviced with the nearest POI entries in other regions. Our
scheme can be readily adapted to address this issue, by generating and distributing to the serving
nodes regional POI data consisting of additional nearest POI entries (when some POI types are
1https://www.google.com/maps
10
unavailable in a region or some out-of-region POI entries are closer to the queriers at the border
of the region), instead of strictly including only POI entries for the current region of the serving
node(s). A k-nearest-neighbor query model [61] can be natural here; returning the k nearest POI
data, including possibly out-of-region POI data.
Protocol 1 Beacon, repeat every Tbeacon
1: Node is in region rid , possessing a valid serving pseudonym, PC with s = 1
2: Broadcast({rid, texp }σPC )
3: return
Protocol 2 POI data update
1: Serving node,U , entering a new region rid ,
2: or reaching a POI update point (i.e., texp for POIr id ) for its current region, rid .
3: if Cache , {} then
4: for each {POIr idi , texpi } ∈ Cache do
5: if ridi == rid and texpi > tnow then
6: return
7: end if
8: end for
9: end if
10: Send({qid, rid}σPC ,LBS) *
11: Receive({qid, {POIr id , texp }σLTCLBS },LBS) *
12: Update Cache with {POIr id , texp }
13: return
Serving Node: As mentioned earlier, the PCA assigns the role of serving node with probability,
Prserve , when a node requests pseudonyms from the PCA. Each pseudonym, PC , of a serving node
has the field s set to 1 (Sec. 4.2). After a node becomes a serving one, it broadcasts a beacon every
Tbeacon , as per Protocol 1. A beacon, signed under PC, includes an rid , indicating the region the
serving node is in, thus the POI data it can provide, and the expiry time of the POI data it has (i.e.,
obtained from LBS and stored locally) for that region.
Serving nodes retrieve regional POI data from the LBS server whenever they enter new regions
(including the case they become serving nodes in their current regions). As shown in Protocol 2,
when a serving node enters a new region, it checks whether the latest POI data, covering that entire
region, has been cached (during a previous visit to the same region). If not (or the cached POI data
is expired), it requests from the LBS server the latest POI data of that region. The serving node
is also responsible for updating POI data from the LBS server to have the latest POI data cached
locally and serve other nodes. The communication between nodes and the LBS server is carried out
over a secure channel, e.g., a TLS channel; we mark steps over a secure channel with asterisk (∗).2
2In general, the format of PCs does not need to comply with the format of a standard X.509 certificate, because PCs can only
include minimal necessary information to keep communication overhead low and to reduce node identifiability [6, 34, 35],
while LTCs can be standard X.509 certificates. As a result, PCs are not compatible with SSL/TLS protocols, but nodes are
required to provide message integrity and authentication by signing the messages with their private keys corresponding to
the PCs. When a node is required to present its LTC (e.g., for a ticket acquisition), an SSL/TLS channel can be established
with the LTC.
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Protocol 3 A node query
1: Node,U , interested in POI data in region rid ; interest expressed by query Qr id
2: Result = Search(Cache,Qr id )
3: if Result , ϕ then
4: return
5: end if
6: j = 0, t = tnow +Twait
7: while j < N do
8: Listen for beacons; wait until t ; if t passed, break
9: Received a beacon {rid ′, t ′exp }σPCUj fromUj .
10: if s == 1 in PCUj , rid ′ == rid and t ′exp > tnow then
11: Send({EKsj (qidj , rid,Qr id , PCU ),ESKUj (Ksj ), tnow }σPCU ,Uj )
12: Receive({EKsj (qidj ,Respj ),Authj , tj }σPCUj ,Uj )
13: j = j + 1
14: end if
15: end while
16: if j == 0 then
17: Send({qid,Qr id }σPCU ,LBS) *
18: Receive({qid,Resp}σLTCLBS ,LBS) *
19: else if j == 1 then
20: b = 1 with probability Prcheck or b = 0 with probability 1 − Prcheck
21: if b == 1 then
22: Send({qid0,Qr id ,H (Resp0),Auth0, t0, PCU0 },LBS) *
23: Receive({qid0,Auth0, result}σLTCLBS ,LBS) *
24: if result is negative then
25: Report = {Ks0 , {EKs0 (qid0,Resp0),Auth0, t0)}σPCU1 }
26: Send({{Qr id ,Report}, tnow }σPCU ,RA) *
27: end if
28: end if
29: else if Conflict exists among {Resp0...Respj−1} then
30: Report = {{Ks0 , {EKs0 (qid0,Resp0),Auth0, t0)}σPCU0 }...
31: {Ksj−1 , {EKsj−1 (qidj−1,Respj−1),Authj−1, tj−1)}σPCUj−1 }}
32: Send({{Qr id ,Report}, tnow }σPCU ,RA) *
33: end if
34: return
LBSQuery: Protocol 3 and Protocol 4 illustrate the querying and the serving process respectively.
When a node is interested in POI data (for its current region rid), it first searches in the local cache
whether the data is cached (while it is/was a serving node) and is still valid (i.e., not expired). If
yes, then the node interest (i.e., the node query) is fulfilled and the process is finished. Otherwise,
the node starts listening to beacons in the network for the period of Twait at most. If a beacon
including rid is received from a serving node (i.e., s = 1 in PC), the regular node sends the query to
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Protocol 4 Serving of a node query
1: A serving node,U , waits for incoming peer query in region rid
2: Receive({EKs (qid, rid ′,Qr id′ , PCU ′),ESKU (Ks ), tU ′}σPCU ′ ,U ′)
3: if rid == rid ′ then
4: Resp = Search(POIr id ,Qr id′ )
5: if Resp , ϕ then
6: Auth = Siдn({qid,Qr id ,H (Resp), tnow }, PCU )
7: Send({EKs (qid,Resp),Auth, tnow }σPCU ,U
′)
8: end if
9: end if
10: return
and receives the response from the beacon sender. If a beacon from a non-serving node is received,
this is considered as misbehavior and reported to the RA.
The query-response process is encrypted with a session key, Ks , generated by the querying
node for each peer query, encrypted with the public key in the serving node’s PC. Thus, the
communication is kept confidential between the two nodes. The node listens and waits for at most
N beacons with the region identifier (rid) of interest, and requests information from the beacon
senders. The sought number of responses, N , is a protocol selectable parameter, used to provide
redundancy for response validation. We explain it in more detail (in response validation) below.
Protocol 4 shows the action of a serving node when a peer query is received. It first decrypts
the session key, Ks , with its private key, and then decrypts the query and the pseudonym of the
querying node with Ks . Once the query is verified, it searches in the local cache according to
the query. If the search yields a result, then the serving node encrypts the response with Ks , and
generates an authenticator, Auth, which can be used to check the correctness of the response with
the LBS server.
Response Validation: Steps 16-33 in Protocol 3 show the response validation approach. To pro-
tect the querying node from false information, forged by malicious serving nodes, and detect/reveal
such misbehavior, the querying node queries N > 1 (discovered) serving nodes, with the same
query within a Twait period. If the waiting timer expires before N responses are received, the node
concludes this process. In an apparently benign system setting (e.g., no malicious node detected
recently), the node could use the information received from the first request and use the rest for
cross-checking. Each (legitimate) serving node by default cached the same (LBS-obtained) POI data
for that region, thus their responses to the same query should be the same (i.e., a given search on
the same data should return the same result, as long as the responders are legitimate). In order to
make sure that any two honest responses from the serving nodes are identical, we assume a query
won’t span across a POI data update point: if a node receives two responses from two serving nodes
before and after the POI data originating from the LBS server were updated, these two honest
responses could result in conflicting data. Without loss of generality, we assume a node waits (i.e.,
does not initiate a query in order to obtain fresher POI data) until the POI is updated (based on the
texp value learned from beacons) if the remaining time is less than Twait/2; in contrast, it initiates
the query after texp is passed. If the remaining time is within [Twait/2,Twait ], the node initiates
the query immediately but it only waits until the end of the currentTPOI period (i.e., texp ), because
any peer response after texp could potentially conflict with previous peer responses.
At the very least, a node query succeeds if at least one serving node is discovered and queried
successfully (i.e., it produces an authenticated response). Nonetheless, this does not provide any
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Protocol 5 Processing of a misbehavior report
1: Receive({{Qr id ,Report}, t}σPCU ,U ) *
2: Send({qid,Qr id }σLTCRA ,LBS) *
3: Receive({qid,Resp}σLTCLBS ,LBS) *
4: for Each {Ksi , {EKsi (qidi ,Respi ),Authi , ti )}σPCUi } in Report do
5: if Respi , Resp then
6: Initiates a pseudonym resolution for PCUi
7: end if
8: end for
9: return
protection in the event this responder is malicious. POI data from additional serving nodes can be
used for cross-checking: any conflicting responses will be reported (with the originally attached
signatures and pseudonyms) to the RA. The higher N is, the faster the detection of malicious nodes
can be expected, especially in an environment with a high malicious node ratio. However, there is
no guarantee that a querying node will discover N serving nodes (before Twait expires). In a less
densely populated area, the number of serving nodes would be also low. Thus, a querying node
might be able to discover only one (in some cases, possibly) serving node. In this case, it will check
the correctness of the single peer response with the LBS server with probability Prcheck .
For each peer query, the serving node generates an authenticator and send to the querying node
with the peer response. An authenticator is a signature on the concatenation of query id (qid), the
LBS query (Qr id ), the hash value of the response (H (Resp)) and the timestamp on peer response (t ).
Once the LBS server receives the request, it first verifies the signature (i.e., the Auth itself) with the
attached serving node’s pseudonym. Once the signature is verified, it fetches the response based
on Qr id from its own database and check the correctness of H (Resp). We use H (Resp) instead of
Resp in order to decrease the communication overhead (typically the size of Resp could be much
larger than a hash value). Again, such validation is possible because the serving node has requested
the POI data covering the entire region; thus, the peer response and the LBS response should be
the same. If they are different, the querying node receives a negative result and reports the peer
response to the RA.
Once the RA receives any report on misbehavior, the RA continues with processing the report
as shown in Protocol 5. The RA checks with the LBS server, submitting the same query as that
by node reporting the misbehavior. If any dishonest peer response is discovered, the RA reveals
misbehaving node(s) through pseudonym resolution (Sec. 4.2).3
POI Type Division: The overhead for obtaining and caching complete regional POI data could
vary, depending on POI density and number of available POI types. A parameter, G , can be used to
adjust the regional POI data overhead for each serving node. G indicates the number of groups
available POI types are divided into. By assigning randomly one of the groups to each serving node
at the time of PC issuance (i.e., role assignment), each serving node is only responsible for that
subset of POI data. To achieve this, PCs of serving nodes should be augmented with the assigned
group(s) (i.e., with an index of each group). The division of POI types can be pre-configured and be
known to all participating nodes (that can map a specific POI type to a specific group). Therefore,
3A malicious serving node could increase the beacon rate attempting to increase the probability to be chosen by a querying
node. Therefore, during the collection of responses from N serving nodes, if the querying node detects any abnormally
high beacon rate from a specific serving node (under the same PC), such misbehavior (i.e., the authenticated beacons at a
high rate) should be reported to the RA.
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when a querying node receives a beacon signed under a PC, it knows, by looking at the group index
in the PC, whether the beacon sender can respond to its query.
5 SECURITY AND PRIVACY EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the achieved security and privacy properties with our scheme. We first
provide a qualitative analysis as per the requirements in Sec. 3. Then, we provide an extensive
quantitative analysis on protecting node privacy against the LBS server and honest-but-curious
nodes and on resilience to malicious nodes.
5.1 Qualitative Analysis
Authentication and integrity: Entity and message authentication and message integrity are
achieved thanks to message digital signature verifications. Message (e.g., beacon) timestamps
prevent replays of old messages. A peer query is encrypted and bound to a specific serving node,
thus it cannot be meaningfully replayed and any other serving node would fast reject it. More
important, the query and response identifiers can trivially allow the (given) same serving (querying)
node to reject and not serve (accept) them, at the expense of modest local memory.
Accountability: In spite of the pseudo-/ano-nymity, upon detection of misbehavior reported
to the RA, the RA can reveal the actual, long-term identity of the reported misbehaving node,
through pseudonym resolution and possibly evict the node from the system. The RA can verify the
truthfulness of the reported misbehavior with the help of the LBS server.
Confidentiality: Communication among nodes and infrastructure entities (LTCA, PCA and
LBS) is kept confidential by using public key cryptography and (symmetric) session keys.
Sybil-resilience: The LTCA and the PCA issue tickets and pseudonyms with non-overlapping
lifetimes, ensuring a node is equipped with only one valid pseudonym at any point in time.
Response validation: Our scheme prevents malicious nodes from providing false information,
using probabilistic serving node assignment, cross-checking and proactive LBS checking. First, each
node is chosen as serving node probabilistically by the PCA and such role is explicitly bound to the
provided pseudonyms. Therefore, a malicious node has no control on whether it becomes a serving
node, which is the only possibility to provide false information to its peers. For a non-serving node,
the waiting time to be assigned as serving node follows a geometric distribution with parameter
Prserve . Thus, the expected waiting time is 1−PrservePrserve · Γ. For example, when Prserve = 0.05 and
Tserve = Γ, an adversary has to wait for 19 ∗ Γ on average before being selected as a serving node.
Second, a malicious serving node has to be chosen by the querying node; again, this selection is
not under the control of any malicious node. There may exist multiple serving nodes around a
querying node that takes the initiative to choose one or multiple (N ) serving node(s). The use of
multiple (redundant) serving nodes can reveal a malicious node by cross-checking their responses,
given all (benign) serving nodes have the same POI data for the region. Moreover, with the help of
the proactive LBS checking mechanism, benign nodes can protect themselves against malicious
nodes when only one peer response is received. Such proactive check does not expose long-term
or short-term identities of the querying node, because the authenticator in a peer response is a
signature generated by the serving node. We provide quantitative evaluation of resilience of our
scheme in Sec. 5.2.
Exposure reduction:Our scheme reduces the exposure to the LBS server by sharing information
among the peers, as its most closely related predecessors [31, 55] did. In addition, through the
controlled selection of serving nodes and encrypted P2P communication, only the selected serving
nodes learn queries. Queries by one node, Uq , to a certain serving node, Us , can be synthetically
linked only while Uq uses the same pseudonym. Moreover, Uq could choose among several Usi
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nodes even within a given region for successive queries. Mobility of all nodes (serving or not),
short-lived pseudonyms, encryption of query-response process, and rotating assignment of serving
nodes minimize exposure to any curious serving node acting alone.
Table 2. Linked queries for different collusion cases
Case Linked queries Colluding entities
C1 Same IdPC No collusion with CA
C2 Same Idt icket Collusion with PCA
C3 Same IdLTC Collusion with PCA and LTCA
However, colluding serving nodes could merge the queries they received, attempting to link
them the same way the curious LBS server would do. Moreover, collusion with the CAs could allow
further linking of queries by linking pseudonyms of the same node. Given the honest-but-curious
assumption for the security infrastructure, the RA is not able to initiate a pseudonym resolution
without any reported and confirmed misbehavior (through a check with the LBS server). Table 2
shows the queries that can be linked for different collusion cases. We provide quantitative evaluation
on node exposure for different collusion cases in Sec. 5.2. We refer to [34, 35] for the information
disclosed to honest-but-curious PKI entities.
The PCA, when colluding with honest-but-curious nodes, could assign the role of serving nodes
to the colluding nodes or increase Prserve within a reasonable range (e.g., from 0.06 to 0.08),
attempting to collect more node queries through the colluding nodes. However, this deviates from
the honest-but-curious assumption for the security infrastructure, because the honest PCA should
randomly assign serving nodes with a given Prserve (defined by system policy).
Jamming: An attacker could jam beacons from benign serving nodes to hinder the provision
of correct responses. This is possible because, by default, beacons from a specific serving node
are predictable, given a specific Tbeacon (e.g., observed based on previously overheard beacons or
specified by system policy). Jamming, i.e., “erasing” benign serving node beacons makes it harder
for malicious serving nodes to be detected through response cross-checks. This can be mitigated
with a random (e.g., uniformly distributed) beaconing interval, so that upcoming beacons from a
specific serving node are not predictable. We show that a random beacon interval has negligible
effect on the performance of our scheme in Sec. 5.2.
5.2 Quantitative Analysis
We further evaluate our scheme through simulations, to show its effectiveness in a real-world
scenario. Exposure to the LBS server and honest-but-curious nodes is quantitatively evaluated
through two metrics: peer hit ratio and exposure degree. The peer hit ratio shows the ratio of node
queries that are hidden from the LBS server, while the exposure degree indicates the accuracy of
reconstructed user trajectories based on exposed user locations. The resiliency of our scheme, in
the presence of malicious nodes, is also evaluated, based on the ratio of affected node queries by
(forged) false responses. We also compare, thorough the two quantitative privacy measurements,
with MobiCrowd [55].
We find that with 6% of the peer nodes acting as serving nodes (i.e., Prserve = 0.06), around
50% of the queries can be hidden from the LBS server. At the same time, the exposure degree
to the LBS server is significantly decreased, from around 0.6 to 0.16. This is achieved thanks to
the aforementioned low ratio of query exposure to the LBS server and the use of pseudonymous
authentication with relatively short-lived pseudonyms. Even in the presence of a high ratio (e.g.,
20%) of colluding honest-but-curious nodes, the exposure degree is kept very low thanks to the
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encrypted peer query-response process. From a different viewpoint, a high ratio (e.g., 20%) of
colluding malicious nodes (i.e., malicious nodes acting as serving nodes providing the same false
response to a node query, in an attempt to defeat the response validation) can affect only less than
1.5% of the node queries (submitted to nearby serving nodes); which can be further mitigated or
even eliminated by proactive LBS checking mechanism with different Prcheck . Moreover, when
achieving a similar peer hit ratio to that of MobiCrowd, we show our scheme achieve a much lower
exposure degree to honest-but-curious nodes and impose a much lower communication overhead.
Table 3. Simulation Parameters (Bold for Default Settings)
L 1, 2, 3 km
Tserve 10min
Γ 10min
τ 1, 2.5, 5, 10min
Tpoi 20, 30, 40, 50, 60min
Twait 5, 10, 20, 30, 60, 90, 120 s
Tbeacon 5, 10, 15, 20, uniform(5, 15) s
Tquery 3min
N 2, 3
Prserve 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.1, 0.12, 0.18
Ratioadv 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5
Prcheck 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1
G 1, 2, 3
Ratiocoop 0.5, 1 (MobiCrowd Only)
Simulation setup:We simulate our scheme with OmNET++4 and the TraCI mobility interface
in Veins [57], connected to the SUMO [38] traffic simulator. We use the Luxembourg SUMO
Traffic (LuST) internal mobility scenario (i.e., with source, destination, or both points internal
to the city) [11] and the TAPAS Cologne mobility scenario [60]. We assume a penetration ratio
of 40%, i.e., 40% of the mobile nodes use LBSs and participate in our collaborative scheme. For
each mobility scenario, we use the traces for the 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm period and use the 1:00 pm
– 2:00 pm part for the evaluation. We assume ideal wireless connection for ad-hoc node-to-node
communication, with a range of 200m. The results are averaged over 5 seeded simulation runs.
In the simulation, we divide the whole area into equally sized regions, with a region size L × L.
Table 3 shows the parameters of our simulation, bold values indicating default simulation settings,
where Tquery is the query interval of a node. For example, if Prserve is the parameter we evaluate,
then we set the rest of the parameters as: L = 2 km, Tserve = Γ = 10min, τ = 5min, Tpoi = 20min,
Twait = 60 s , Tbeacon = 10 s , Tquery = 3min, N = 3, and G = 1. For the evaluation of exposure to
honest-but-curious nodes and resilience to malicious nodes, we set Ratioadv = 20% and Prcheck = 0
by default.
For MobiCrowd, we assume a querying node broadcasts its query every 10 s and consider
collaboration/cooperation ratio (Ratiocoop ) values of 0.5 and 1. We set default Ratiocoop to 0.5 for
MobiCrowd: a node would respond with a probability of 0.5 to peer queries. In our scheme, we do
not consider Ratiocoop , because Prserve can be considered as a combination of collaboration ratio
and actual serving node assignment probability. For example, an actual serving node assignment
probability of 0.12 and a collaboration ratio of 0.5 could result in the equivalent Prserve = 0.06.
Peer Hit Ratio: The peer hit ratio reflects the ratio of hidden node queries from the honest-but-
curious LBS server. It is defined as the ratio of the node queries for which a response is obtained
using local or peer caches (of serving nodes), while the remaining is responded by the LBS server
itself. Fig. 4 shows the peer hit ratio as a function of Prserve for the LuST scenario. Figs. 4a to 4c
show peer hit ratio with L = 1, 2, 3 km respectively and the rest of the parameters having the default
values in Table 3. Peer hit ratios improve with increasing Prserve . For example, we see a significant
increase in peer hit ratio when Prserve increases from 0.02 to 0.04, while such improvement becomes
moderate for high Prserve values (e.g., from 0.1 to 0.12). Thus, modest Prserve (e.g., 0.06 or 0.08)
4omnetpp.org
17
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
Prserve
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pe
er
H
it
R
at
io
Local Cache
Peer Cache
(a)
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
Prserve
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pe
er
H
it
R
at
io
Local Cache
Peer Cache
(b)
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
Prserve
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pe
er
H
it
R
at
io
Local Cache
Peer Cache
(c)
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
Prserve
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pe
er
H
it
R
at
io
Local Cache
Peer Cache
(d)
Fig. 4. LuST: Peer hit ratio as a function of Prserve with L = (a) 1 km, (b) 2 km, (c) 3 km, and (d) Tbeacon ∼
uni f orm(5, 15)s .
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Fig. 5. TAPASCologne: Peer hit ratio as a function of Prserve with L = (a) 1 km, (b) 2 km, and (c) 3 km.
is enough to hide a significant amount (e.g., more than 50%) of queries from the LBS server. We
see a slight increase in peer hit ratio with larger region sizes, because more serving nodes exist
in each region. Moreover, with a small region size, more queries are initiated at the borders of
regions, thus querying nodes are more likely to cross to other regions while waiting for a response.
Fig. 4d shows that a uniformly distributedTbeacon does not affect the peer hit ratio; while it protects
benign serving nodes from being jammed (Sec. 5.1).
Fig. 5 shows the peer hit ratio for the TAPASCologne scenario: it follows the same trend as
in Fig. 4, but values are slightly higher for the TAPASCologne scenario than those for the LuST
scenario. This is because the node density in the central part of TAPASCologne is higher than
those in the central part of LuST: higher density results in higher numbers of serving nodes given
a Prserve . This is confirmed through Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. Fig. 6a and Fig. 7a show node density maps
(nodes per 1 km × 1 km region) at 1 pm for the LuST and TAPASCologne scenarios, and Figs. 6b
to 6d and Figs. 7b to 7d show maps of the peer hit ratio with different L. We see a clear correlation
between node density and peer hit ratio in each region; as expected, the peer hit ratio is roughly
proportional to the node density. For the LuST scenario and the default settings, in the central
area, the peer hit ratio exceeds 0.5; it approaches 0.8 in the densest region: the higher the node
density, the higher the exposure reduction to the LBS server. For TAPASCologne, the peer hit ratio
even approaches 95% in the densest areas. For a low-density region, a local relative increase of the
system parameter, Prserve , could improve the peer hit ratio with a modest increase in overhead.
Figs. 8a to 8d show peer hit ratios as a function ofTwait ,Tbeacon , τ andTPOI , respectively. Higher
Twait allows a querying node more time to discover serving nodes, and lower Tbeacon for a serving
node results in a higher probability to be discovered by nearby querying nodes; thus both result
in a higher peer hit ratio. However, a change in τ or TPOI does not affect the number of serving
nodes in the system or the probability of discovering serving nodes, thus the peer hit ratio remains
roughly the same as τ or TPOI changes.
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Fig. 6. LuST: (a) Node density for each region at 1 pm with L = 1 km. Peer hit ratio for each region with (b)
L = 1 km, (c) L = 2 km, and (d) L = 3 km.
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Fig. 7. TAPASCologne: (a) Node density for each region at 1 pm with L = 1 km. Peer hit ratio for each region
with (b) L = 1 km, (c) L = 2 km, and (d) L = 3 km.
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Fig. 8. LuST: Peer hit ratio as a function of (a) Twait , (b) Tbeacon , (c) τ , and (d) TPOI . (Default: Twait = 60 s ,
Tbeacon = 10 s , τ = 5min and TPOI = 20min.)
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Fig. 9. LuST: Peer hit ratio as a function of Prserve with (a) G = 2, and (b) G = 3. Peer hit ratio for each
region with (c) G = 2 and Prserve = 0.12, and (d) G = 3 and Prserve = 0.18.
We evaluate further our scheme considering multiple groups of POI types (i.e., G > 1). Fig. 9
shows the peer hit ratio as a function of Prserve , with G = 2, 3. Given a Prserve , the peer hit ratio
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Fig. 10. LuST with MobiCrowd: Peer hit ratio as a function of (a)TPOI , andTwait with (b) Ratiocoop = 1 and
(c) Ratiocoop = 0.5. (Default: TPOI = 20min, Twait = 60 s and Ratiocoop = 0.5.)
decreases as G grows (Figs. 9a and 9b), because less serving nodes exist for a queried POI type.
In order to achieve the same level of cache hit ratio, Prserve should increase accordingly with G.
When a serving node is interested in a POI type that it is not responsible for (thus, not cached),
it queries the LBS server directly, because it had already exposed itself to the LBS server while
obtaining regional POI data. Therefore, the cache hit ratio withG = 3 and Prserve = 0.18 is lower
than that with G = 2 and Prserve = 0.12; the reason is that more serving node queries are sent
directly to the LBS server with G = 3 and Prserve = 0.18.
Fig. 10 shows the peer hit ratio achieved by MobiCrowd for the LuST scenario. From Fig. 10a, we
see that the peer hit ratio slightly increases asTPOI increases, because cached POI data is valid for a
longer period, thus serving more peer (and own) queries. Figs. 10b and 10c show the peer hit ratio as
a function of Twait when the collaboration ratios are 1 and 0.5 respectively. A higher collaboration
ratio results in a higher peer hit ratio. However, a longerTwait period does not necessarily improve
the peer hit ratio. For example, it slightly increases as Twait increases from 10 s to 60 s , but it
decreases for Twait = 90 s . Long Twait increases the probability to encounter nodes that cached
the required POI data, but it decreases the chance to serve other nodes with its own cached POI
data (that could have been obtained earlier from the LBS server with a shorter Twait ). The peer hit
ratio is around 0.7 with MobiCrowd when Ratiocoop = 0.5 and Twait = 10 s . Our scheme provides
roughly the same peer hit ratio when Prserve = 0.12 (Fig. 4b) with the default simulation settings.
However, our scheme significantly improves over MobiCrowd in terms of exposure and overhead.
MobiCrowd trades off higher node exposure to neighboring honest-but-curious nodes and higher
communication overhead for increased peer hit ratio.
Node Exposure: After gauging node privacy through the peer hit ratio, we refine the measure-
ment of node exposure to curious LBS servers and curious peer nodes with the help of the exposure
degree (ExpoDeд), defined for any node as:
ExpoDeд(IdLTC ,C) =
∑
Idi ∈ID(IdLTC ,C)
T (Idi )
T (IdLTC ) ∗
RH (Idi )
R(IdLTC ) .
IdLTC is the node long-term identity, corresponding to a whole series of node actions in the
system. ID(IdLTC ,C) is a set of identities, corresponding to IdLTC , exposed to the honest-but-
curious (possibly colluding) entities for collusion case C (Table 2). ID(IdLTC ,C) differs for different
collusion cases.T (Idi ) is the corresponding trip duration of a node under identity Idi ∈ ID(IdLTC ,C).
R(Idi ) is the number of regions the node visits during its trip under identity Idi and RH (Idi ) is
the number of visited regions exposed to honest-but-curious entities under the same identity Idi .
RH (Idi )
R(IdLTC ) indicates the exposure degree under a single identity Idi . To derive the exposure degree
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of a node, the exposure degrees under each Idi are weighted by a time parameter T (Idi )T (IdLTC ) : the
ratio of the (partial) trip duration under identity Idi over the total trip time. The exposure degree
indicates the accuracy of reconstructed node trajectories based on recorded node queries, taking
into consideration the effect of pseudonymous authentication on location privacy protection. We
measure exposure to colluding curious nodes through the aggregation of the recorded queries.
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Fig. 11. LuST: ExpoDeд to the LBS server as a function of (a) Prserve . ExpoDeд to the LBS server as a function
of Twait with MobiCrowd when (b) Ratiocoop = 1 and (c) Ratiocoop = 0.5. ExpoDeд of (d) non-serving and
(e) serving nodes to the LBS server as a function of Prserve . TAPASCologne: (f) ExpoDeд to the LBS server as
a function of Prserve . (Default: Twait = 60 s and Prserve = 0.06.)
Figs. 11a and 11f show the average ExpoDeд (i.e., the average over all nodes) for exposure
to the LBS server as a function of Prserve , for different collusion cases, for the LuST and the
TAPASCologne scenarios respectively. The collusion caseC3 is equivalent to the case that messages
are authenticated with node LTCs (i.e., no pseudonymous authentication). Prserve = 0 is equivalent
to the case that all queries are sent to the LBS server. For the LuST scenario, ExpoDeд is around
0.6 without any protection in place: even if all the queries are sent to the LBS server, ExpoDeд is
not 1 because a node enters and exits one or more regions between two successive queries. With
pseudonymous authentication only, ExpoDeд drops below 0.3 and bounces back to around 0.4 for
the collusion case C2. With the decentralized information sharing scheme in use, the exposure
decreases further. For example, when Prserve = 0.06, ExpoDeд is around 0.16 for C1, but rises to
around 0.4 for C3.
Fig. 11b and fig. 11c show ExpoDeд to the LBS server with MobiCrowd when Ratiocoop = 1 and
Ratiocoop = 0.5 respectively. We see a lower Ratiocoop could result in higher ExpoDeд. However,
ExpoDeд with Twait = 10 s and Ratiocoop = 0.5 is lower than ExpoDeд with Prserve = 0.12 in
our scheme, although these two settings result in a similar peer hit ratio (Fig. 4b and Fig. 10c).
This is because serving nodes in our scheme need to continuously expose their locations to obtain
regional POI data. Figs. 11d and 11e show the ExpoDeд for non-serving nodes and serving nodes
respectively. The ExpoDeд for non-serving nodes in our scheme is roughly the same as the ExpoDeд
for MobiCrowd in the above two settings. Although serving nodes have much higher ExpoDeд,
a probabilistic and periodical assignment of serving nodes balances high exposure among nodes
throughout their trips. However, the ExpoDeд to honest-but-curious nodes for MobiCrowd is much
higher than the ExpoDeд to honest-but-curious nodes for our scheme.
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Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 show ExpoDeд to honest-but-curious nodes. We assume that the honest-but-
curious nodes could collude, merge recorded queries and link the queries (as the LBS could do).
Fig. 12 shows ExpoDeд as a function of Ratioadv . Fig. 12a and Fig. 12d show ExpoDeд when N = 2,
with and without P2P encryption respectively. Fig. 12a shows that a modest realistic Ratioadv (e.g.,
0.05 and 0.1) results in relatively low ExpoDeд. For example, when Ratioadv = 0.05, ExpoDeд is
lower than 0.05 for C1 and C2, and it is slightly higher for C3. However, without P2P encryption
(Fig. 12d), ExpoDeд significantly increases, because all queries within the communication range
of an honest-but-curious (serving or non-serving) node can be recorded. For example, ExpoDeд
for Ratioadv = 0.05 and Ratioadv = 0.1 without encryption are almost the same as those for
Ratioadv = 0.3 and Ratioadv = 0.5 with encryption, respectively. This shows the importance of
query encryption in terms of reducing node exposure. We see the same effect (mentioned above
for N = 2) in Fig. 12b and Fig. 12e, when N = 3. Fig. 12d and Fig. 12e show that ExpoDeд steadily
increases as Ratioadv increases, and rather “flattens” out as Ratioadv grows from 0.2 to 0.5. This
shows that non-encrypted P2P communication significantly increases ExpoDeд, as it strengthens
the capability of honest-but-curious nodes even in settings with relatively low Ratioadv . ExpoDeд
only slightly increases from N = 2 (i.e., Fig. 12a and Fig. 12d) to N = 3 (i.e., Fig. 12b and Fig. 12e),
because a querying node cannot always discover exactly N serving nodes withinTwait . An increase
in N could help evicting malicious nodes from the system more efficiently with a slightly higher
overhead (see the evaluation for resilience below).
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Fig. 12. LuST: ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes as a function of Ratioadv with (first row) and
without (second row) P2P encryption when N = 2 (first column), N = 3 (second column) and N = 3 with
Tbeacon ∼ uni f orm(5, 15)s (third column).
Fig. 13 shows ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes as a function of Prserve . Again,
the encrypted P2P communication has a significant effect on reducing ExpoDeд. ExpoDeд for both
encrypted and non-encrypted P2P communication increases with increased Prserve , because higher
Prserve results in a higher number of honest-but-curious serving nodes in the system given a
Ratioadv . Therefore, more peer queries would be disclosed to honest-but-curious serving nodes.
The third columns of Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 show ExpoDeд with uniformly distributed Tbeacon for the
default settings; again, this has negligible effect on ExpoDeд. Fig. 14 shows the same trend for
ExpoDeд for the TAPASCologne scenario with N = 3, with a similar ExpoDeд increase from the
LuST scenario to the TAPASCologne scenario, which can be observed from Fig. 11a and Fig. 11f.
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Fig. 13. LuST: ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes as a function of Prserve with (first row) and
without (second row) P2P encryption when N = 2 (first column), N = 3 (second column), and N = 3 with
Tbeacon ∼ uni f orm(5, 15)s (third column).
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Fig. 14. TAPASCologne: ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes with and without P2P encryption as
a function of (a, b) Ratioadv and (c, d) Prserve . (Default: Ratioadv = 0.2 and Prserve = 0.06.)
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Fig. 15. LuST: ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes as a function of Prserve with and without P2P
encryption for (a, b) L = 1 km and (c, d) L = 3 km.
Fig. 15 show ExpoDeд for different L. A smaller region decreases ExpoDeд, because the simulated
area is divided into more regions for smaller L (thus more regions a node visits during its trip),
while the number of exposed regions could remain roughly the same.
We continue the evaluation withG > 1. Fig. 16 shows that ExpoDeд decreases asG increases for
the same Prserve , because less queries are responded by the serving nodes. ExpoDeд increases with
higher G under the comparable settings (i.e., G = 1 and Prserve = 0.06, G = 2 and Prserve = 0.12,
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Fig. 16. LuST: ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes as a function of Prserve with and without P2P
encryption for (a, b) G = 2 and (c, d) G = 3.
and G = 3 and Prserve = 0.18), because more serving nodes expose themselves continuously
with their beacons. For example, for these settings, ExpoDeд for C1 is around 0.07, 0.09 and 0.11
respectively in Fig. 13b, Fig. 16a, Fig. 16c.
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Fig. 17. LuST: ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes with P2P encryption as a function of (a)Twait ,
(b) Tbeacon , (c) τ and (d) TPOI . (Default: Twait = 60 s , Tbeacon = 10 s , τ = 5min and TPOI = 20min.)
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Fig. 18. LuST with MobiCrowd: ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes with (a, b) Ratiocoop = 1
and (c, d) Ratiocoop = 0.5 as a function of Twait (a, c) and Ratioadv (b, d). (Default: Twait = 60 s and
Ratioadv = 0.2.)
Figs. 17a and 17b show ExpoDeд to colluding honest-but-curious nodes with P2P encryption
as a function of Twait and Tbeacon respectively. ExpoDeд slightly increases with longer Twait and
shorter Tbeacon ; in accordance with the peer hit ratio shown in Figs. 8a and 8b. Fig. 17c show
ExpoDeд as a function of τ with a fixed Γ = 10min. ExpoDeд significantly increases with increased
τ forC1, because more queries can be linked together under the same pseudonym when its lifetime
is longer. For C2, the trend is that ExpoDeд slightly decreases with increased τ , given the same Γ,
because lower τ results in less pseudonym requests per trip (see Sec. 4.2). For example, consider a
node trip duration of 15min. With a fixed Γ = 10min, the nodes needs two pseudonym requests
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Fig. 19. LuST: Ratio of malicious serving nodes with (a) N = 2, and N = 3 when L = (b) 1 km, (c) 2 km, and
(d) 3 km.
when τ = 1min. For example, the first pseudonym request covers a duration of 9.5min and the
second pseudonym request covers the rest of 5.5min. However, when τ = 10min, if there is, e.g., 2
min, remaining in the current τ , three pseudonym requests would be needed for the same example.
The node would use the pseudonyms obtained through three requests for 2min, 10min and 3min
respectively. Thus, the latter case results in lower ExpoDeд, because the node exposure is “split”
under three Idt icket rather than two for the former case. ExpoDeд remains the same under different
TPOI (Fig. 17d), because this only affects the communication overhead of serving nodes for updating
POI data and does not change the probability of encountering serving nodes by querying nodes.
Fig. 18 shows ExpoDeд for MobiCrowd. ExpoDeд increases with longer Twait , because more
queries are broadcasted before the LBS server is queried. Higher Ratioadv also increases ExpoDeд
as expected. Fig. 4b and Fig. 10c showed that MobiCrowd with Ratiocoop = 0.5 and Twait = 10 s
provides a similar peer hit ratio as our scheme with Prserve = 0.12 and Twait = 60 s for the LuST
scenario. However, from Figs. 18c and 18d, we see that for MobiCrowd, ExpoDeд is higher than for
our scheme. For example, with the above settings and Ratioadv = 0.2, ExpoDeд for MobiCrowd
is around 0.16, 0.25 and 0.38 for C1, C2 and C3 respectively: that is, higher than the 0.12, 0.17 and
0.26 values achieved by our scheme.
Resilience:We evaluate the resilience of our scheme against malicious nodes. We consider the
same Ratioadv values as those for the evaluation of the exposure. Although a ratio e.g., 20 %, of
adversarial nodes (thus, node owners) may be unrealistic, we consider such a rather harsh setting
to capture situations with extensive node infection by malware [8, 52] while node owners can be
benign and unsuspecting. We assume that, node owners can be notified and malicious nodes be
reinstated as benign nodes through, e.g., diagnostics and updates, once misbehavior is reported and
malicious nodes are identified. A recovered benign node would be issued a new LTC and obtain new
PCs. Thus, old PCs from detected malicious nodes will be revoked and published through the latest
CRL. In the simulation, we assume the malicious serving nodes collude to provide identical false
responses (based on falsified data stored locally) to a specific node query, so that the false responses
appear consistent and thus be accepted by the querying node. Otherwise, even the responses from
independently acting malicious serving nodes could be conflicting and be easily detected.
Fig. 19 shows the ratio of the adversarial serving nodes over time, when Prcheck = 0. Even
though 20 % of the nodes are compromised, the ratio of non-detected malicious serving nodes
(over all serving nodes) is less than 10 %, for the majority of time for both N = 2 (Fig. 19a) and
N = 3, with different region sizes (Figs. 19b to 19d). The periodical ratio peaks are due to the
simultaneous reassignment of roles to the participating nodes. Without misbehavior detection (i.e.,
cross-checking), the ratio would have roughly remained the same as Ratioadv (i.e., 20 %). However,
the controlled selection of serving nodes effectively limits active participation of malicious nodes,
and the cross-checking mechanism further helps detecting and evicting them from the system.
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Fig. 20. LuST: Affected node query ratio as a function of Ratioadv with (a) N = 2, and N = 3 when (b) L = 1
km, (c) L = 2 km, and (d) L = 3 km.
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Fig. 21. TAPASCologne: Ratio of malicious serving nodes with (a) N = 2, and (b) N = 3. Affected node query
ratio as a function of Ratioadv with (c) N = 2, and (d) N = 3.
Moreover, the ratio of “active” malicious nodes (i.e., ones that could actually provide false responses)
is always less than 1 % for all cases: a significant decrease from the original Ratioadv . This shows
that even if 20 % of the nodes are compromised (by a “master” adversary), the ratio of actual
usable compromised nodes is considerably lower (i.e., less than 1 %). Such low ratio of “active”
malicious nodes is reflected on the ratio of the affected node queries in Fig. 20: for example, when
Ratioadv = 0.2, around only 1.5 % of the node queries get false peer responses that are not detected.
This happens when all peer responses to a node query are given by malicious serving nodes, thus,
there is no conflict. If conflicting responses are received, the querying node checks the correctness
with the RA and reports the misbehavior accordingly (Sec. 4). The adversarial serving node ratios
and affected node query ratios are overall lower for the TAPASCologne scenario (Fig. 21), because
higher node (thus benign serving node) density facilitates the detection of false peer responses
(thus the eviction of malicious serving nodes).
For the evaluation above, we did not presume the availability of prior information on the security
status of malicious peers. This can be available through a periodically publicized CRL by the PKI,
and in turn, can further improve resilience to faulty peers. We consider next the effect of a CRL
on malicious node detection: for simplicity, assume that the CRL is readily available to nodes,
eliminating the effect of delay for obtaining the CRL (which can be practically downloaded or
distributed [36]). Consider, a query fromU1 was responded by two malicious serving nodesUms1
andUms2 , whileUms2 was detected later as misbehaving node through a query fromU2 responded
byUms2 and a benign serving nodeUbs1 . Once U1 obtains the latest CRL, it can do a post-checking
for its queries responded byUms2 . This could further revealUms1 as a misbehavior, which, in turn,
could disclose more node queries served by single false peer responses fromUms1 . Figs. 22a and 22d
show the ratio of non-detected attacked (refereed as attacked in the rest of the paper) node queries
when N = 3 with the above mentioned post-checking. For example, when Ratioadv = 0.2 for the
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Fig. 22. LuST: (first row) and TAPASCologne (second row): Non-detected attacked node query ratio as a
function of (first column) Ratioadv , and Prcheck when (second column) Ratioadv = 0.2 and (third column)
Ratioadv = 0.5. (Default: Ratioadv = 0.2 and Prcheck = 0.)
LuST scenario, the ratio of attacked queries is around 0.2%: a significant decrease from 1.5%, as
shown in Fig. 22a, thanks to the access to the CRL.
Figs. 22b and 22e show the ratio of attacked node queries as a function of Prcheck with Ratioadv =
0.2. We see the attacked node query ratio almost reaches 0 when Prcheck is higher than 0.5. When
Ratioadv = 0.5 (Figs. 22c and 22f), Prcheck should be set to higher than 0.7 (or even 1), in order to
achieve the same performance. With such a high ratio of serving nodes proven to be malicious, the
system should instruct the benign nodes to proactively defend themselves (and the system) against
the malicious nodes. Moreover, as described earlier, proactive LBS checks do not expose benign
querying nodes (i.e., do not harm their privacy), because the authenticators are the signatures
generated by the serving nodes (Sec. 4.3).
Fig. 23 shows the resultant resilience with G > 1. From Fig. 19c, Fig. 23a and Fig. 23d, we see
the trend that the overall adversarial serving node ratio is higher as G grows, due to the higher
Prserve being set. As a result, affected and attacked node query ratios also increase with higher G.
For example, the attacked node query ratio is around 0.2%, 0.3% and 0.5%, with Ratioadv = 0.2, in
Fig. 22a, Fig. 23c and Fig. 23f respectively.
Communication Overhead:We close this section with a comparative evaluation of the com-
munication overhead based on simulation results for our scheme and MobiCrowd. In our scheme,
only serving nodes need to request regional POI data, and querying nodes only obtain responses
with POI entries that match their queries. However, in MobiCrowd, nodes always obtain regional
POI data (that is, not the subset of precise interest) either from their peers or from the LBS server,
in order to keep the POI data verifiable with the LBS-provided signatures.
Fig. 24 shows the communication overhead in terms of the average number of regional POI
data obtained from the LBS server (and peers, for MobiCrowd only). Figs. 24a to 24c show the
number of regions with L = 1, 2, 3 km respectively. Around 6 regional POI data are obtained by
each serving node when L = 1 km, while around 3.5 regional POI data are obtained when L = 2 km.
This reduces to around around 0.6 and 0.4 for L = 1 km and L = 2 km if averaged over all nodes
(when Prserve = 0.06): a previously non-serving node could be chosen as the serving node in a
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Fig. 23. LuST: (First column) Ratio of malicious serving nodes, (second column) affected node query ratio as
a function of Ratioadv , and (third column) non-detected attacked node query ratio as a function of Ratioadv ,
with (first row) G = 2 and Prserve = 0.12, and (second row) G = 3 and Prserve = 0.18.
future trip, thus the load is balanced among all nodes. A region size with L = 2 km (L = 3 km) is 4
(9) times as large as region size with L = 1 km. Therefore, larger L results in higher communication
overhead for obtaining regional POI data, although the number of obtained regions is decreased.
The actual communication overhead depends on actual POI entry size and POI density in each
region. Consider a typical value from the literature [42, 49], e.g., 500 bytes for each POI entry. If
there are 10 000 POI entries in each regional POI data set, then the communication overhead for
obtaining regional POI data is around 5 Mbytes , while a region with 100 000 POI entries results in
50 Mbytes . Consider regional POI data of 5 Mbytes . For the default settings, a serving node needs
to proactively obtain around 17.5 Mbytes of regional POI data (for around 3.5 regions, as shown in
Fig. 24b) during their trips to effectively serve other nodes. This reduces to around 2 Mbytes (for
around 0.4 region) if averaged over all nodes. For peer queries and direct LBS queries, only the
required POI entries need to be obtained. For example, if 10 POI entries are returned for each query,
then around 5 Kbytes of POI data needs to be obtained: significantly lower than the communication
overhead for obtaining the entire regional POI data. Figs. 24d and 24e show a comparison of
communication overhead between our scheme and MobiCrowd. With MobiCrowd, each node need
to obtain around 3 regional POI data from the LBS server and their peers: significantly higher than
0.4 in our scheme. With higher G (Figs. 24f and 24g), the average number of obtained regional
POI data remains roughly the same as in Fig. 24b, because the average node mobility remains the
same with even if G changes. However, the overhead for obtaining regional POI data decreases by
a factor of 1/G accordingly.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We further evaluate experimentally the performance of our scheme with vehicular OBUs. An
OBU has a 1.66 GHz dual-core CPU and it is equipped with an IEEE 802.11p interface for P2P
communication. We implement our scheme with C++. Elliptic Curve (EC) public/private key pairs
are used for asymmetric cryptography and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 256-bit
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Fig. 24. LuST: Average number of obtained regional POI data as a function of (a, b, c) Prserve when L =
1, 2, 3 km, as a function of TPOI with (d) our scheme and (e) MobiCrowd, and as a function of Prserve with
(f) G = 2 and (g) G = 3.
session key is used for symmetric key encryption. We use Crypto++ 5 for the Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and OpenSSL6 for the rest of cryptographic algorithms (e.g.,
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and AES). Table 4 shows the parameters we
use in the experiment.
Table 4. Experimental Parameters
Serving Querying Query Generator Beacon Generator
Node num. 5 1 2 2
Tbeacon Exp( 15s ) - - -
Tquery - 5 s Exp( 10.5s ), Exp( 16s ) -
γ 1, 2.5, 5 Hz - 40, 100, 200 Hz
EC size 192, 224, 256 bit 256 bit
N - 1, 2, 3 -
We run experiments in two different settings. In the first setting, we use five OBUs as serving
nodes, each broadcasting beacons at a rate of 1Tbeacon . We use one OBU as a querying node, with a
node query rate of 1Tquery . Two additional query generators are introduced to emulate a large number
of querying nodes in the network, each with a much higher node query rate (Tquery = Exp( 10.5s ))
than the aforementioned querying node. The beacon interval and the query generator intervals are
exponentially distributed, to emulate beacons and queries from mobile neighboring serving and
querying nodes, from the perspective of the querying node we evaluate. We randomize the two
aforementioned intervals so that network load changes over time and across experiments.
We also run experiments in a VC specific setting with each serving node and querying node
running a transportation safety beacon application: broadcasting signed safety beacons (termed
5www.cryptopp.com
6www.openssl.org
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Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs)) and verifying received safety beacons. We consider
three CAM rate values, 1, 2.5 and 5 Hz. Although a maximum γ = 10 Hz is possible according
to the standard [14], CAM rate adaptation schemes [47, 54, 58] show that an adaptive CAM rates
(generally lower than 10 Hz), considering channel load and vehicle mobility, leads to higher CAM
reception ratio. Therefore, we consider modest CAM rates rather than the high-load approach
(10 Hz). We add in our experimental setup two CAM generators, each broadcasting CAMs at a rate
equivalent to an aggregate of 40 nodes (thus 80 nodes in total). Tquery is also adjusted to roughly
match the aggregate query rate of 80 nodes. With Tquery = Exp( 16s ) for each query generator, and
Tquery = 5 s for the evaluated querying node, the average Tquery is roughly 2.5min for each node
(among the 81 emulated nodes). In this setting, we only use EC-256 keys (which is the level in the
corresponding standard [14]).
Moreover, we evaluate processing delays with an implementation of MobiCrowd. With Mo-
biCrowd, once a querying node obtains and caches the regional POI data, it no longer needs to
query other nodes. With the limited number of OBUs in the testbed, all nodes would have the
regional POI data cached locally within a short period. However, to benchmark the processing
delays with MobiCrowd in our experiment, the querying nodes continuously broadcast queries
(without turning themselves into cached nodes, i,e, nodes that cached the local POI data).
We evaluate a setting with 3 querying nodes and 3 serving nodes (i.e., nodes that cached the
regional POI data), with the same settings for CAM rates for the six evaluated nodes and the two
CAM generators. Essentially, we emulate a network of 86 nodes, among which three nodes cached
the regional POI data and three querying nodes are interested in the POI data. We downloaded the
OpenStreetMap POI database for Luxembourg 7, and found that the highest number of POIs in a
region with L = 2 km is around 5000. Consider a size of 500 bytes for each POI, we assume the
regional POI data in our experiment is 2.5 Mbytes .
Table 5. Computation operations for each message type
Our scheme MobiCrowd
Sender Receiver Sender Receiver
Beacon ECDSA signing ECDSA verification - -
Peer query
ECIES encryption,
AES encryption,
ECDSA signing
ECIES decryption,
AES decryption,
ECDSA verification
ECDSA signing ECDSA verification
Peer response
AES encryption,
ECDSA signing
AES decryption,
ECDSA verification None ECDSA verification
Table 6. EC cryptographic benchmarks on OBU and P2P query/response sizes
Security Sign(ms )
Verify
(ms )
Encryption
(ms )
Decryption
(ms )
Query
(byte )
Response
(byte )
Plaintext - - - - 500 5000
EC-192 1.75 1.95 6.52 4.73 1263 6877
EC-224 2.65 2.94 8.13 5.54 1303 6897
EC-256 3.03 3.42 9.43 6.22 1343 6921
Table 5 shows computational overhead for each message type generation and validation. Table 6
shows the benchmark for EC cryptographic operations on an OBU, and query/response sizes in
7https://osm.kewl.lu/luxembourg.osm/
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their plaintext, as well as signed and encrypted forms. We use UDP broadcasting for beacons from
serving nodes and TCP for P2P query-response process. In the experiment, the beacon size is 340
bytes (with a signature and a PC attached) and we consider pure query and response sizes of 500
bytes and 5000 bytes (in accordance with the communication overhead in Sec. 5) respectively. The
extra communication overhead for secured formats is due to the attached (encrypted) symmetric
key, the digital signature and the signer’s PC. We encode all binary data (including keys, signatures
and cipher texts) into Base64 format, which further increases the size by 4/3.
Figs. 25a and 25e show the average processing delay for the querying node and the serving
node, for peer query and response with different combinations of N and EC key size values.
Tquery = Exp( 10.5s ) is used for this experiment. The query sending delay includes the TCP handshake
delay; the query reception delay on serving nodes does not include the TCP handshake delay,
because it is not possible to record the starting time point of the TCP handshake (i.e., the starting
time point of accepting a connection request by the listening socket in C++) on the serving nodes.
For the querying node, we see the communication delays with different key sizes, given the same
N , are roughly the same, because the difference in communication overhead (with different key
sizes) is negligible compared to the total secured query/response size (see Table 6). For example,
when N = 3, the average communication delay (i.e., the sum of query sending and response
receiving delays) of the querying node with EC-192, EC-224 and EC-256 keys are around 68ms , 66
ms and 67ms respectively. At the same time, the average total processing delay slightly increases
with increased key size, due to higher cryptographic processing latencies.
However, given a key size, the average communication delay experienced by the querying node
significantly increases as N increases, because more peer responses are required for the same
needed node queries. For example, with EC-192, the average processing delay at the querying node,
with N = 1, N = 2, and N = 3, is around 55ms , 68ms and 88ms respectively.
For the serving nodes, the average processing delay does not change significantly for different
N , because a serving node needs to handle high rates of incoming query even when N = 1, thus
may be saturated by high communication overload. From the experiments, we find that the TCP
handshake delay is much higher than the networking delay for sending query/response messages.
In our evaluation, the query delay includes the TCP handshake delay; while a response delay does
not include a TCP handshake, because a TCP connection was already established upon receipt of
the query. Figs. 25a and 25e show that the former is significantly higher than the latter one for any
combination of N and EC key size values.
The communication delays in Figs. 25b and 25f are higher than those in Figs. 25a and 25e
even with lower query rate values for the query generators, because the network is loaded with
CAMs. Moreover, the processing delay slightly increases because a safety beacon application is
running in parallel with the LBS application: CAM generation and reception need frequent signature
generations and verifications. Overall, we see only a modest increase in networking and processing
delays even in such demanding network setting (note: we rely on software-only cryptographic
operations, refraining from using a hardware accelerator that could validate several hundreds of
signatures per second).
Figs. 25c, 25d, 25g and 25h show processing delays for MobiCrowd. From Figs. 25c and 25g, we
see the computational delays for MobiCrowd are lower than those in our scheme, because only
signature verifications are required, without any encryption. However, we found the transmission
of 2.5 Mbytes regional POI data over a TCP connection requires more than 10 s . In a realistic
network with highly mobile nodes, transmission delays could be possibly higher, and essentially
not workable with the current OBUs and protocol stack. Although such transmissions can be
potentially done through a different type of connection, or over a Roadside Unit (RSU) as the
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Fig. 25. Average processing delay on (first row) querying node and (second row) serving node. (First column)
Without CAM application. (Second column) EC-256 keys with CAM application. (Third column) Computa-
tional and (fourth column) communication delays for MobiCrowd with EC-256 keys and CAM application.
proxy, our scheme or any scheme that requires exchange of much smaller data sizes is definitely
advantageous, especially in a network with highly mobile nodes.
Discussion: Our scheme leverages P2P interactions, requiring node-to-node communication
within the network. In this experiment, our scheme is evaluated with vehicular OBUs, each equipped
with an IEEE 802.11p interface, as user devices. IEEE 802.11p is designed mainly for safety applica-
tions in VC domain. Apart from 802.11p, many network technologies support P2P (or device-to-
device (D2D)) communication. WiFi-Direct [7] and Bluetooth [25] can be used for P2P commu-
nication, supported by most off-the-shelf smartphones nowadays. However, they do not support
fully decentralized ad-hoc networking, i.e., a master node is needed and other nodes can join the
network by connecting to the master. Therefore, they only support communication with a star
topology, which is not fully decentralized. Moreover, the number of slaves a master can maintain is
limited. LTE-Direct [41] and upcoming 5G networks [59] support D2D communication with the
help of network infrastructure, while research on fully ad-hoc (direct) D2D communication has been
ongoing [41]. While 802.11p is designed for VC, D2D communication in cellular networks could
be supported by smartphones or any 4G/5G enabled device, which could promote the adoption
of P2P-based technologies, as is the proposed scheme here. An alternative approach, before the
full deployment and support for direct D2D communication, is using infrastructure mode WiFi
networking, readily supported by off-the-shelf smartphones nowadays. Smartphone users can
connect to an access point, and broadcast/multicast messages (e.g., beacons) and carry out P2P
interactions (e.g., query and response) via the access point. This requires users to connect to the
same access point. In pedestrian settings, e.g., in a campus, this could be an option, but this is less
so in a vehicular setting, considering the limited coverage of an access point and the mobility of
vehicles: frequent switching from one access point to another would be necessary and users could
be connected to different access points even if they are close to each other.
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7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secure decentralized privacy protection scheme for LBS. Our approach
extends the recent P2P LBS privacy protection approach, addressing a number of practical open
issues. More important, it ensures resilience to malicious nodes, and low exposure to honest-but-
curious nodes and LBS servers even if they collude with an honest-but-curious identity management
facility. With a simulation-based quantitative analysis, we showed that the exposure to honest-but-
curious nodes is low even if a high ratio (e.g., 20 %) of nodes are honest-but-curious and collude;
while the same ratio of malicious nodes could only affect less than 1.5 % of the peer-responded node
queries. We showed the deployability of our scheme with an implementation on an automotive
testbed and discussed the alternative approaches for deployment.
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